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COMMENTS
EXTRADITION VS. REMOVAL FROM UNITED STATES
TERRITORIES
INTRODUCTION
An interesting problem has arisen recently, concerning the procedure for
the removal of a prisoner, under grand jury indictment, from one United
States territory to another. May the court employ the removal procedure af-
forded by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or must it compel the
demanding territory to resort to extradition?
One court has recently answered the question in the case of U.S. v.
Wrigbt,' where the United States Commissioner sought removal of the de-
fendant, Vernestine Wright, from the Territory of Hawaii to the Territory of
Alaska. The attempted removal was based on an indictment returned by a
grand jury for the District Court of Alaska, charging the defendant with the
offenses of assault with intent to rob, and of robbery, in violation of the
laws of Alaska.
The court, Wiig, J., found that it had no authority to order the removal of
the defendant, and suggested that the extradition laws of Alaska and Hawaii
offered the appropriate procedure for return of the defendant.
It is our purpose in this comment, to analyze and evaluate the reasoning
of the court in this holding, and to compare the legal problems which arise
under the law of extradition with those arising under the removal procedure
afforded by the new Federal Rules.
ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL CASE
Under the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,, adopted September
1, 1945, it appears that the United States Commissioner had a plausible
enough argument to invoke Rule 40 (b) providing for the issuance of a re-
moval warrant, based on the facts of this case. The pertinent sections of
the Federal Rules are as follows:
Rule 40 (b) Arrest in Distant District
(3)1tearing - Warrant of Removal or Discharge.
If it appears from the commissioner's report or from the evi-
dence adduced before the judge that sufficient ground has been
1. 15 F.R.D. 184 (D. Hawaii 1954).
2. 18 U.S.C. (1952).
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shown for ordering the removal of the defendant, the judge shall
issue a warrant of removal to the district where the prosecution is
pending. Otherwise he shall discharge the defendant. If the prose-
cution is by indictment, a warrant of removal shall issue upon pro-
duction of a certified copy of the indictment and upon proof that
the defendant is the person named in the indictment.
Rule i. Scope.
These rules govern the procedure in the courts of the United
States and before the United States commissioners in all criminal
proceedings, with the exceptions stated in Rule 54.
Rule 54. Application and Exception.
(a) Courts and Commissioners.
(1) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in
the United States district courts, which include the District Court
for the Territory of Alaska and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands; in the United States Court of Appeals; and in the Supreme
Court of the United States .... (Italics supplied)
Applying the above rules to the facts in the Wright case, it appears that
all the requirements of the Rules were met, and that the court should have
issued its removal warrant almost as a matter of course. However, the court
refused to do so, because, it said, the offense charged was not one against
the United States, but against the Territory of Alaska only.' As authority
for this position the court relied principally on two cases, Ex narte
Krause,4 and U.S. v. Sloan,' in both of which removal was refused because
a local, rather than a federal, offense was involved. We believe, however,
that neither of these two cases created authority for the holding in the
Wright case, and that this court, although it may have arrived at a sound
result, nevertheless did so through fallacious reasoning.
First, consider the Krause case. Here the court refused to order the- re-
moval of the defendant from the state of Washington to the Territory of
Alaska to face a charge of kidnapping, which, at that time, was not an of-
fense against the United States. The significant words in the court's opin-
ion were as follows:'
It is fundamental that the United States courts, as such, can only
entertain jurisdiction of offenses against the United States. If the
offense charged is not an offense against the United States, this
court would not have jurisdiction to try the petitioner if it had
been within this district. ...
However, when the court made the foregoing comment, in 1915, the pres-
ent Federal Rules were, of course, not in effect, and the opinion, to be in-
3. 15 F.R.D. at 18,.
4. 228 Fed. 547 (W.D. Wash. 1915).
5. 61 F.Supp. 439 (D. Mont. 1945).
6. 228 Fed. at 5-49.
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telligently applied, should be read in conjunction with the removal lawthen
in effect, which provided as follows:'
... that for any crime against the United States... it shall be the
duty of the judge of the district where he is imprisoned to issue,
and of the marshall to execute, a warrant for his removal to the
district where the trial is to be had.
In the Sloan case, a United States district court, sitting in Montana, re-
fused removal of the defendant, charged with perjury in violation of the
laws of Alaska, from Montana to Alaska, and, like the court in the Wright
case, decided that the demanding auhtorities should resort to extradition.'
The Sloan case was decided on June 18, 1945, a few months before the nw
rules went into effect, and again, in order to properly appreciate its signifi-
cance, we must refer to the wording of the removal provisions then in
force:"
... For any crime or offense against the United Scates... it.
shall be the duty of the judge of the district court where he is
imprisoned seasonably to issue, and of the marshall to execute, a
warrant for his removal to the district where the trial is to be
held.
It will be seen that the removal provisions in effect when each of these
two cases was decided, although not identically worded, clearly provided
that the offense must be one against the United States. These words log-
ically supported the Krause and Sloan holdings that Federal removal pro-
cedure could not be used where a purely territorial offense was involved.
Today, however, the key words, "against the United States" are conspic-
uously absent from the'removal provisions of the Federal Rules; rather, the.
Rules merely designate the various court in which the procedure may be
employed,'o without regard to the type of offense or the identity of the
sovereign. For this reason we believe the court in the Wright case erred in
treating the holdings in Ex parte Krause, and U.S. v. Sloan as authority,
based as they are, on rules no longer in effect.
It further appears that the Wright decision is based on unnecessarily
shaky grounds, since the court might have arrived at the same result in a
more plausible fashion by considering the special status of the Alaska
7. Rev. STAT. § 1014 (1875).
8.61 F. Supp. at 441. At this point the court quotes from U.S. ex rel McDermott
v. Jaeger el al, 126 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1942):
Whether the crime is an offense against the United States or is merely a
local offense turns not on the procedural entitlement of the case but on the
nature of the crime. If it were only a local offense then it seems that ex-
tradition would be required... but the sItuataodis otherwise a to a cadrp,
of a federal crime.
The court also relied on U.S. v. Jones, Adm'r, 236 U.S. 106 (1914); Iu re Moran,
203 U.S. 96 (1906); Maxwell v. Federal Gold and Copper Co., 155 Fed. 110 (8th
Cit. 1907); U.S. v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, No. 14694 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1940).
10. FED. R. CRI,:. P. I, 54(a) (1), supra.
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court. The District Court for the Territory, of Alaska has four divisions,"
and acts in a dual capacity, having jurisdiction over cases arising under
the laws of the United States and of the Territory." It could be reasoned
that the "District Court for the Territory of Alaska" referred to in Rule 54
(a) (1) was logically intended to designate this court in its capacity as a
United States district court, rather than in its purely local capacity. Re-
spectable authority for this interpretation may be found in Mookini v. U.S.-,
where 'Mr. Justice Hughes pointedly brought out the basic constitutional
differences between the United States district and territorial courts. 14
Seemingly contradictory, however, to the' language used by Justice
Hughes is Note 5, Advisory Committee on Rules, following Rules 54 in the
United States Code. This note makes the following observation, in referr-
ing to the District Court for the Territory of Alaska:"
Although a legislative rather than a constitutional court, it is,
nevertheless deemed a court of the United States, and has the
jurisdiction of district courts of the United States ....
These words, taken in conjunction with Rule 1,16 could readily justify a
decision in which the Alaska court were regarded in all respects as a non-
territorial United States district court, and, if such a view were taken, a
result contrary to that in the Wright case would almost certainly follow."
Apparently, then, it is possible to find substantial authority to support
either view on the propriety of removal of extradition where facts such as
those in U.S. v. Wright are involved. Possibly the court should have con-
sidered another factor in making its decision, namely public policy. What
are the advantages and disadvantages of removal procedure as opposed to
extradition? If precedent does not clearly point the way, 'should not the
court choose that policy which will result in greater uniformity in the law
11. 62 STAT. 986 (1948), 48'U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
12. Ibid. Cf. Carscadden v. Territory of Alaska, 105 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1939). See
also note 5, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. GRIM. P. 54.
13. 303 U.S. 201 (1938).
14. Id. at 205:
The term 'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules, with-
out an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic signifi-
cance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article 3 of the
Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly
speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often
held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested
in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a 'District
Court of the United States.'
Justice Hughes then cited U.S. v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159 (1933); Summers v.
U.S., 232 U.S. 92 (1913); Stevens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899); McAllis-
ter v. U.S., 141 U.S. 174 (1891); In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263 (1890); Reynolds v. U.S.,
101 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. The note gives the following as authority for its contention: McAllister v.
U.S., supra note 14; Coquitlam v. U.S., 163 U.S. 346 (1896); Ex parte Krause, supra
note 4; 62 STAT 986 (1948), 48 U.S.C. §§ 101, 101a (1952).
16. The significant words are '"in the courts of the United States."
17. Note that the same problem does not arise in the case of the United States
District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, since this court has the same status as
a non-territorial United States district court. See 28 U.S.C. $ 91 (1952).
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relating to fugitives, and the minimum of dilatory court procedure? To ans-
wdr this question. we will go on to make a brief comparison between the
legal problems arising under the law of extradition and those arising under
removal procedure.
HISTORICAL
At one time, it was not at all certain that extradition proceedings could
be put into effect where a United States Territory was one of the parties.
To understand this uncertainty we must take a look at the Constitution it-
self, where the extradition clause provides as follows:"
A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime,
who shall flee from justice, and be found in any other State, shall
on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdic-
tion of the arime.
Note, at this point, the repeated use of the word "state" in the above.
Standing alone, this clause indicates that the framers of the Constitution
either overlooked or did not anticipate the use of extradition to and from
United States territories. However, the First Congress in 1793, decided
that this constitutional provision was not self-executing,", in that it did
not provide for suitable "machinery" to enforce it, and, accordingly en-
acted the first federal extradition act,", reading as follows:
Whenever the executive authority of any state or territory demands
any person as a fugitive from justice,.., it shall be the duty of the
executive authority of the state or territory to which such person
has fled... to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent
[of the demanding authority].
It will be seen that while the Constitution makes no mention of United
States territories, the federal extradition act specifically provides for ex-
tradition between both states and territories. Inevitably, this discrepancy
was brought to issue, - in the early case, Ex parte Morgan,"1 where the
court, Parker, J., remarked:"1
Of course Congress cannot legislate beyond the power given to
it by the Constitution. The exercise of its legislative authority
must be because of a power expressly given, or of one which is
necessary to carry out and make effective one expressly given in
the Constitution. The Constitution uses the word 'state' alone,
and the act of Congress uses the words 'state' and 'territory'. It
18. U.S. CONST. ART IV, § 2.
19. This is discussed as dicta in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80 (1885), at page
94.
20. 1 STAT. 302 (1793).
21. 20 Fed. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883).
22. I at 303.
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is a question which will admit of serious discussion. But it must
be remembered that, under Article 4, Section 3 of the Constitution,
Congress has the power to make all needful rules and regulations
relating to the territories of the Union, to extradite their fugitive
criminals, and it has the power to pass such a rule, not, perhaps
under the extradition clause of that instrument, but under the
clause relating to the territories, and this rule is binding on the
states and to be observed and obeyed by them. I believe therefore,
that this part of the act of Congress is valid. ...
It must be added, as an anticlimax, that this quotation must be regarded
as dicta only,- since the court, notwithstanding the conclusiveness of the
foregoing, based its actual holding on other grounds. 1 Nevertheless, this
dicta has been drawn upon to support the holdings in a few subsequent
cases."
One year later, the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the
same issue in Ex parte Reggel, " ' and settled it with the following forthright,
if not entirely logical,statement:"'
Although the constitutional provision in question, does not, in
terms, refer to fugitives from the justice of any state, who may be
found in one of the territories of the United States, the Act of Con-
gress has equal application in that class of cases ...
A few other early cases may be found, in which the extra-constitutional
nature of the federal extradition act is raised as an issue," but all avoid
meeting the problem head-on, and, today, the constitutionality of extradition
to and from United States territories might be considered settled, if at all,
by default rather than by decision."9
TYPICAL PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE
LAW OF EXTRADITION
Extradition has traditionally been a source of difficulty and frustration to
law enforcement authorities." Much of the difficulty involves problems in
23. lad at 304:
But in my view of this case, this question need not be decided..
24. In this case, the Chief of the Cherokee Nation sought extradition of the de-
fendant from Arkansas. The court denied extradition on the theory that the Chero-
kee Nation was neither a state nor a territory, and was thus unable to initiate valid
extradition proceedings under any interpretation of the law.
25. Ex parte Krause, supra note 4; Kemper v. Metzger, 169 Ind. 112, 81 N.E. 663
(1907); Ex parte Hagen, 295 Mo. 435, 245 S.W. 336 (1922).
26. 114 U.S. 642 (1884).
27. Id. at 650.
28. In re Romaine, 23 Cal. 585 (1863); Ex parle Dickson, 4 Ind. T. 481, 69 S.W.
943 (1902).
29. The present-day version of the federal extradition act (18 U.S.C. § 3182) has
substantially the same wording as the act in force when the foregoing cases 'were
decided.
30. See, I ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST 769-798 (1st ed. 1949); 24
OHIO BAR ASSOC. REP. 761 (1951); HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CON-
TROL (1942); 21 AM.BAR ASSOC. J. 89.
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the conflict of laws, since, in addition to the Constitutional provision, and
the federal extradition act discussed above, each state has enacted its own
extradition laws." Thirty-eight states" and the Territory of Hawaii have
adopted the Uniforfs Criminal Extradition Act," but even between such
states conflicts do arise. These may be due to slight modifications made
by the state legislatures from the wording of the Uniform Act,"1 or to dif-
ferent court interpretations of identical sections.- Obvious constitutional
issues have had to be settled."
A few examples of the problems outlined above may prove interesting.
State v. Hall," a landmatk case, illustrates a problem in constitutional in-
terpretation; in this case the defendant, standing in North Carolina, shot
a bullet across the state line into Tennessee, killing his victim. The Tenn-
essee authorities attempted to extradite the defendant from North Carolina,
but it was held that since he was not physitafly present in Tennessee when
the crime was committed, he was immune from Tennessee's extradition pro-
ceedings. The basic problem represented by this case, namely, how to ex-
tradite the perpetrator of an act, performed in one state and resulting in the
commission of a crime in another, has arisen in several cases" which have
generally held that extradition will not lie. Section 6 of the Uniform Ex-
tradition Act attempts to plug this loophole by providing:
The governor of the state may also surrender, on demand of the
Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this state
charged in such other state in the manner provided in Section 3
with committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intention-
tionally resulting in a crime in the state whose Executive Author-
ity is making the demand.., even though the accused was not in
31. The federal act is, of course, very general in its terms. State acts provide
for die procedural details of extradition, - method of arrest and detention, exemp-
tion from civil process, habeas corpus proceedings and so on.
32. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachussets, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dokota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wiscon-
sin, Wyoming.
33. 9 U.L.A. 169.
34. Compare the Massachussets version of § 10 of the Uniform Act (Mass. G.L. c.
276 § 19) with the corresponding section in the Oklahoma act, (22 OKLA. STAT.
ANN. § 1141.10) Also compare § 18 of the Uniform Act as enacted in California
(PEN. CODE § 1553) with the Maryland act (MD. CODE 1951, Art. 41, § 31.)
35. For example, the term "fugitives" found in § 2 has .given rise to a variety
of legal definitions and interpretations. Compare State v. Whitlock, 32 Ala. App.
560, 28 So.2d 172 (1946); Ex parte Koelsch, 212 Ark. 199, 205 S.1.2d 186 (1947);
Ex Parle King, 139 Me. 203, 28 A,2d 562 (1942); Com. ex rel Bucksburg v. Good,
162 Pa. Super. 557, 5 A,2d 842 (1948); Ex parte Williams, 71 S.D. 95, 21 N.W.
593 (1946).
36. See, Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.S. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev'a4 188 F.
2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951); Gulley v. Apple, 213 Ark. 350, 210 S.W. 2d 514 (1948);
McLarnan v. Ilason, 243 Iowa 379, 49 N.W. 2d 887 (1951).
37. 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
38. Ex parte Hoffstot, 218 U.S. 665 (1910); Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 64
(1905); People ex ret Corkran v. Hyatt, 188 U.S. 691 (1903); Muney v. State, 88
Fla. 354, 102 So. 547 (1924); Seeley v, Beardsley, 194 Iowa 863, 190 N.W. 498
(1922).
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that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not
fled therefrom.
As we have indicated, a problem in constitutional interpretation presents
itself here, since the effect. of this provision is to enlarge the scope of in-
terstate rendition" to cover a three-state situation not specifically provided
for in the Constitution.4° In fact, it requires a decidedly liberal (perhaps
"loose" would be a better word) interpretation of the words used therein
to reconcile the Constitution with Section 6 as quoted above. Nevertheless,
in the few cases which have passed on this question, the constitutionality
of Section 6 has been upheld." Questionable though the reasoning of these
decisions may be,' they seem to do no greater violence to the Constitution
than did Ex parte Morgan," and Ex parte Reggel,44 where the word "state"
was judicially declared a synonym for " United States territory". The Com-
missioner's prefatory note- in the Uniform Laws Annotated expresses the
opinion that the provisions of Section 6 are enforcible as a matter of com-
ity'6 between the states, rather than any duty imposed on the states by the
Constitution. This distinction seems somewhat academic, since, as we will
mention later, the governor of th (asylumag state may quite arbitrarily re-
fuse to surrender the prisoner in any event, and, to this extent, all extradi-
tion proceedings might be looked upon as a matter of comity.
Problems in the substantive law of the demanding state frequently arise
because of the duty of the executive authority of the asylum state (estab-
lished by a long line of decisions-) to satisfy itself that a crime against
the laws of the demanding state has been properly charged. Many decisions
may be found in which extradition was refused because the wording of the
39. 1 ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST 769;
While the term 'rendition' is preferably proper to 'extradition' referring
to the surrender by states, they are used interchangeably throughout our
law. And while 'extradition' is preferable to 'rendition' referring to such
surrender between nations or sovereignties, yet nowadays, 'extradition'
is generally used to apply to all such surrenders between international
or national sovereignties.
40. Note 18, supra.
41. Ennist v. 3aden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So.2d 160 (1946); Faulds v. Herberich,
301 N.Y. 614, 93 N.E. 2d 913 (1949); English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E.
2d 898 (1947); Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944).
42. For example, in.English v. Matowitz, supra note 41the court says:
It is to be observed that there ale no negative provisions in the U.S.
Constitution forbidding the extradition of one not pljysically Present at
at the scene of the crime in the demanding state.
Similar to this kind of reasoning is the argument, advanced in some decisions,
that the express terms of. Article IV, § 2 may be by-passed through the exercise
bf the state police power. See, Notes, 26 ;NEB. L. REV. 649 (1947), 22 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 60 (1948), 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 439 (1949).
43. Note 21, supra.
44. Note 26, supra
45. 9 U.L.A. 172.
46 Harlan, J., in Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906), said, at page 211:
By 'comity' nothing-more is meant than that courtesy on the part of one
state by which within her territory the laws of another state are recog-
nized and enforced, or another state is assisted in the execution of her
laws.
47. Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1
(1909); Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387 (1908); Appleyard v. Massachussets, 203
U.S. 222 (1906) are cases of historic significaoce; a recent reaffirmation of the
principle may be seen in Cassis v. Fair, supra note 41.
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requisition issued by the demanding state was defective in some par-
ticular." The hair-splitting niceties involved in some of these decisions
illustrate a typical source of frustration to law-enforcement officials in ex-
tradition proceedings. The prisoner himself may raise the issue of the suff-
iciency of the charge, usually by habeas corpus proceedings." This in turn
may bring into issue the jurisdiction of the court entertaining the writ,"0
and in some cases, relief may be given to the prisoner by the federal
courts.' The decisions seem to lack uniformity concerning the extent into
which the asylum state should inquire into the validity of the charges made
by the demanding state. An interesting comparison may be made between
Peopleex rel Wolosbin v. Warden of City Prison,2 where the court in the
asylum state saw fit to inquire in some detail into the issue of the prison-
er's presence in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the
crime, with Paulke v. State," where the court sharply restricted itself to a
mere perusal of the warrant, and refused to consider the fact that the pris-
oner had been previously discharged for the same offense by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Closely related to the question of the validity of the demanding state's
charge, is that of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. Section 20 of the
Uniform Act expressly forbids the asylum state from inquiring into this
question; however, if the prisoner can show that he is innocent as a matter
of law rather than of fact, it is easy to argue that the requisition itself is
invalid. Some decisions fail to make clear which of the two rules is really
being applied, and, in effect, violate Section 20, under the guise of declar-
ing the requisition invalid."
As we indicated previously, a serious weakness exists in extradition pro-
cedure in that the governor of theasylum state may arbitrarily refuse tosur-
render the prisoner.- The Uniform Act does not provide for any discretion
on the governor's part, rather, the wording of Section 2, describing his
duties, is quite positive in tone." An early case, Kentucky v. Dennison,"
held that mandamus would not lie to compel the governor of Ohio to deliver
48. bee Ex pare Davis, 333 Mo. 262, 62 S.W.2d 1086 (1933); Ex parte Hubbard,
201 N.C. 472, 160 S.E. 569 (1931).
49. As provided in § 10 of the Uniform Act.
50. As in Morgan v. liorrall, 175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1949), cert, denied, 338
U.S. 827 (1949); Ex parte Wallace, 38 Wash. 67, 227 P.2d 737 (1951).
51. See Day V. Keim, 2 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1924); Ex panle Thaw, 209 Fed. 56
(D. N.H. 1913).
52. 197 Misc. 609, 95 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
53. 25 Ala. App. 212, 143 So. 585 (1932).
54. People ex rel Higley v. Millspaw, 257 App. DiV. 40, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435 (3d
Dep't 1939); Com. ex rel Mattox v. Superintendent of County Prison, 152 Pa.
Super. 167, 31 A.2d 576 (1943).
55. This point is discussed in the following cases; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall.
366 (U.S. 1873); In re Murphy, 321 Mass. 206, 27 N.E.2d 413 (1947); State v. Wynn,
356 Mo. 1095, 204 S.W.2d 927 (1947), People ex rel Higley v. Millspaw, supra note
54.
56. ...Subject to the provisions of this act ...it is the duty of the governor
of this state to have arrested
57. 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1860).
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the prisoner to the demanding state. This case has been consistently fol-
lowed, where, for some reason or other, the governor so refuses.
Such are but a few of the more important problems which arise under ex-
tradition law, and which we mention to illustrate its inefficiency in many
instances. However, problems also arise when removal procedure is emp-
loyed, and we will discuss these next.
TYPICAL PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER
THE LAW OF REMOVAL - FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCED7JRE. s
In the first place, since the law governing the removal of prisoners from
one district to another concerns one sovereign only, namely the United
States, conflicts problems would seem theoretically impossible.." Hence
one fertile source of litigation is eliminated, and defendants such as the
one in State v. Hall"0 are less likely to slip through the outraged fingers
of the state prosecutor.
Somewhat remniscent of extradition law is the provision in the Federal
Rules that, prior to removal, the prisoner is entitled to appear before the
judgt of the "asylum" district, and that the judge must be satisfied that
"there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged" before granting removal." Questions as to the identity
of the accused62 and his probable guilt" may be raised and may defeat re-
moval. As in the case of extradition, habeas corpus proceedings may be
instituted by the prisoner to bring these matters into issue. Other grounds
for denial of removal are invalidity of the indictment," lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court," or that removal is sought to a district other than the one.
where the offense was allegedly committed." Likewise analogous to ex-
tradition law is the holding that the question of the guilt or innocence of
the prisoner may not be raised. °' According to the Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Rules, following Rule 40, the purpose of the rules estab-
58. In this section, we have cited cases arising under the new Federal Rules,
wherever possible. However, several cases decided under the old rules have been
included where the corresponding provisions in effect today are of the same signigi-
c oc e.
59. Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20 (1906) is concerned with a 'conflict' between
state and federal law, which arose due to the wording of the removal provisions
then in effect. The question in this case was whether state or federal procedure,
should apply to the inquiry hearing on application for removal.
60. Note 37, supra.
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(b) (3).
62. Mathues v. U.S., 19 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1927); Duffy v. Keville, 16 F.2d 828
(D. Mass. 1926).
63. Johnson v. Hotchkiss, 35 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1929; Bartletta v. Mulheron, 9
F.2d 963 (D. N.J. 1925). It is important at this point to distingish between the
issue of probable guilt and actual guilt; see note 67, inlra. an' the related text.
64. Ex parte Black, 147 Fed. 832 (E.D. Wise. 1906), a/i'd 160 Fed.431 (7th Cir.
1908).
65. Horner v. U.S., 143 U.S. 207 (1892).
66. Kay V. Snyder, 20 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 1.8. 550(1927); Ireland v. Henkle, 179 Fed. 993 (S.D. N.Y. 1910).
67. Hawkins v. Bottbwick, 5 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1925); U.S. ex tel Semel v. Fitch,
66 F.Supp. 206 (D.Conn. 1946); U.S . v. Frankfeld. 34 F.Supp. 17 (D.Mass. 1940).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
lished for the removal of prisoners is to provide safeguards against their
"improvident removal to a distant district." This represents a basic-
ally different legal concept from the "purpose" of the extradition laws,
which is to overcome the barrier of state sovereignty, rather than to fur-
nish protection to the prisoner. A disadvantage to the removal procedure, as
far as the prisoner is concerned, has recently been established in Heltzer
v. U.S.,- where it was held that an order of removal is not appealable,
where the prisoner is under indictment.
A few attacks have been made on the constitutionality of removal pro-
ceedings; in Beavers v. Haubert,'9 on the grounds that the accused was
denied the right to a speedy trial; and in a recent case, U.S. v. Binion,0
where the defendant asserted that the proceedings violated Article III,
Section 2, clause 3, guaranteeing trial "where the said crimes shall have
been committed" also the Sixth Amendment, which says that "the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jyry of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed". In both
cases the constitutionality of the removal proceedings was upheld.
CONCLUSION
Comparing the legal problems which arise under extradition law, with
those arising under the removal procedure afforded by the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, we believe the most important distinctions are the
absence of problems in Conflict Law where removal is employed, and in
the absence of procedural delays attendant to negotiations between two dif-
ferent sovereigns. Of the remaining legal problems, many, such as the
question of the validity of the indictment, are pretty much the same in both
instances, and the others are of a miscellaneous and relatively unimportant
character.
For these reasons then, we believe that it would be in the public interest
to encourage the use of removal procedure in borderline cases such as the
Wright case, rather than to force the parties concerned into the uncertain
field of extradition law. Furthermore, the result in U.S. v. Wright seems
fundamentally unstund in that extradition procedure is intended to defeat
the asylum afforded to criminals because of difference in sovereignty. As
far as Hawaii and Alaska are concerned, the sovereign is the same, and we
are faced with the anomalous result that, in this case, the United States
has to employ extradition to move criminals around within its own possess-
ions.
From another point of view, however, the decision in the Wright case is
commendable, even though we may not entirely agree with its reasoning.
The resuIr tends to strengthen the osition of the Alaska court as an in-
68. 188 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1951).
69. 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
70. 13 F.R.D. 238 (D. Nev. 1952). cert. demned, 345 .S. 935 (1953).
COMMENTS
dependent unit, approaching, if not actually reaching, the status of a state
supreme court.
John C. Whitehouse
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL EFFECT OF FOREIGN GUARDIANSHIP
PROCEEDINGS IN FLORIDA
A rather involved litigation culminating in the decree rendered on rehearing
in Beverly Beacb Properties, Inc. v, Nelson'presented several problematic
points of conflict law for the resolve of the Florida Supreme Court.
Briefly, the facts involved were: the decedent, domiciled in Florida for
many years, sojourned to California, where he spent the last remaining five
years of his life and died. While he was living in California, the California
court adjudicated him an incompetent, appointed Dora Miller as his guard-
ian, and authorized her to vote shares of stock which the incompetent
owned in a Florida corporation. Dora Miller voted the shares (by proxy) to
ratify a sale of Florida land, which was the main asset of the corporation.
The California court validated the sale. After the decedent's death, Dora
Miller was appointed in California as executrix of his will in original pro-
bate proceedings upon a finding that the decedent was domiciled in Cali-
fornia. Later, Samuel Nelson was appointed administrator c.t.a., in an origi-
nal administration proceeding in Florida, predicated on a finding by the
Florida court that the decedent was at all times prior to and at his death
domiciled in Florida."
The primary purpose of the litigation was to set aside the sale of the
corporation's land which the guardian's vote of the decedent's stock author-
ized.
An analysis of the Court's final decree adjudicating this claim will be
attempted towards the end of divining the court's position on the con-
flicts of law problems presented.
Reversing its position on rehearing, the court held that the California
appointed guardian could vote shares of stock in a 'Florida corporation
whikh her ward owned: that it was incumbent upon Florida to recognize the
validity of the acts of the California guardian by virtue of the mandates of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.
It is elementary that the appointment of a guardian of the person of an
incompetent by a state having personal jurisdiction over the incompetent is
due recognition in sister states by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.' However, it is equally well settled that the guardian has no
rights as concerns property of the ward, real or personal, -which is situate
in another than the state which appointed him.4
1. 68 Sa2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
2. Miller v. Nelson, 160 Fla. 410, 35 So.2d 288 (1940).
3. In re Baxter, 191 Iowa 407, 182 N.W. 217 (1921); In re Chase, 195 N.C. 143,
141 S.E. 471 (1928).
4. Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613 (1880); Brown v. Fox, 51 Atl. 621 (N.J. (1901);
George v. Cleveland Trust Co., 22 Ohio 1, 153 N.E. 914 (Court of Appeals ofOhio
1926); In re McGuigan's Estate, 349 1?a. 581, 37A.2d 717 (1944).
